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Abstract
The idea of incongruity-resolution has frequently been suggested as an account of many types of joke. However, there is
no precise statement either of this “theory” nor of its main concepts (incongruity and resolution), and different authors
may disagree on details. We concentrate on two particular variants and attempt to clarify what would be needed to make
these into computational models.
1 Introduction
In recent years, there has been increasing interest within
artificial intelligence in the modelling of humorous be-
haviour, a phenomenon which had for some time been
regarded as particularly challenging. One of the diffi-
culties in constructing computational models of humour-
interpretation or humour-generation is that there are no
detailed formal theories of humour. One possible approach
to remedying this deficiency is to take some of the many
ideas that have been proposed informally within the lit-
erature of philosophy, psychology, linguistics, and other
non-computational disciplines, and try to make the pro-
posals more precise. That is the aim of this paper. Starting
from a widely advocated idea, the incongruity-resolution
theory of humour, we develop some sketches of what pro-
cessing steps might be needed in interpreting certain classes
of joke, and we indicate some research subproblems. The
assumed problem will be the interpretation of a joke, rather
than the generation of a joke, or a declarative statement of
its form. This is not just because we wish to consider a
specific computational task, but also because the propos-
als we are starting from all take that perspective.
Within this short paper, it is not possible to move from
the existing ideas to a completely detailed or formal model,
but we hope that the analyses presented here are a useful
first step towards a more precise account.
As a simplifying assumption, we will consider (as many
authors do) just humour conveyed in language – verbally
expressed humour.
2 Incongruity
If there is one generalisation that can be extracted from
the literature about humour, it is that humour involves in-
congruity. This point, with varying terminology, has been
made by numerous authors (Keith-Speigel (1972) lists 24,
the earliest from 1759), and remains current, appearing in
work as varied as Katz (1993) and Attardo (1997).
The main problem, if we are to develop a detailed the-
ory of verbally expressed humour, is that the notion of
‘incongruity’ is not clearly defined, and it is not even ob-
vious that all the writers on this subject have exactly the
same concept in mind. This is a typical definition from an
ordinary dictionary:
incongruous: 1. out of keeping or place; inappropri-
ate; unbecoming. 2. not harmonious in character; incon-
sonant; lacking harmony of parts. 3. inconsistent. [Ran-
dom House College Dictionary (Revised Edition).1988.
Random House, NY.]
Some academic definitions do not go beyond this in
their precision, and it is rare to see anything more detailed
than the following widely-cited definition:
Laughter arises from the view of two or more
inconsistent, unsuitable, or incongruous parts
or circumstances, considered as united in one
complex object or assemblage, or as acquir-
ing a sort of mutual relation from the pecu-
liar manner in which the mind takes notice
of them. (Beattie, 1776), quoted in Raskin
(1985)
3 Resolving Incongruity
There is sometimes a debate as to whether incongruity
alone is sufficient for humour, or whether it is necessary
for the incongruity to be resolved; that is, to be shown
to be logical, or at least less incongruous than was first
thought. The usual statement of the incongruity-resolution
(IR) model postulates that humour is created by a multi-
stage process in which an initial incongruity is created,
and then some further information causes that incongruity
to be resolved. Shultz (1976) claims that this analysis is of
‘immense heuristic value in accounting for vast samples
of humour’.
The way of creating and resolving the incongruity can
be quite varied, as are the analyses presented in the liter-
ature. Rothbart (1977) suggests that in the joke (1), the
incongruity is presented by the question part – namely,
that the question appears to have a surprisingly easy an-
swer – and then resolved in the answer (which is also a
surprise).
(1) What is grey, has four legs, and a trunk? A mouse
on vacation.
With example (2), Shultz (1976) says that the answer is
initially seen as incongruous, with wafer interpreted as “a
type of cookie”, but then resolution occurs with the real-
isation that there is an alternative interpretation, “away
for”.
(2) Why did the cookie cry? Because its mother had
been a wafer so long.
Pepicello and Weisberg (1983) quote Shultz (1974) as
saying that the word wafer actually creates the incongru-
ity, and go on to claim that in an ‘informal study’ most
people interpret wafer as “away for” initially, thus sub-
verting the analysis of Shultz (1976). Rothbart and Pien
(1977) say that (2) has three incongruities: a cookie cry-
ing, the ‘surprisingness’ of the answer, and the cookie
having a mother.
Rothbart and Pien also say that in (3), the question
presents an incongruous situation, and the answer both
explains (resolves) it and adds a new incongruity.
(3) Why did the elephant sit on the marshmallow? Be-
cause he didn’t want to fall into the hot chocolate.
In contrast, Pepicello and Weisberg (1983) claim that
the comparably structured joke (4) is simply a parody of
a riddle, in which a question is posed which is impossible
to answer.
(4) Why do elephants paint their toenails red? So they
can hide in cherry trees
Suls (1977) analyses (5) in IR terms, since the answer
‘comes as a surprise’ but can be made to follow from the
question with a little thought.
(5) If your son flunks out of school and is illiterate and
anti-social, what can he grow up to be?
An Italian policeman.
Despite this apparent disagreement, there are some
particular variants which are more clearly defined. Two
of these, which are somewhat similar, are the two-stage
model of Suls (1972) and the notion shared by (for ex-
ample) (Shultz, 1976, p.13), (Minsky, 1980, p.10) and
Paulos (1980), which here will be referred to as the sur-
prise disambiguation model. (Although Suls claims that
his model is also applicable to cartoons, we will consider
it here only as an account of verbally expressed humour).
For both models, there is a certain basic arrangement, as
follows. A joke is analysed as being in two main parts:
the initial portion of text, the set-up (or joke body (Godke-
witsch, 1976)), and the second part, the punchline. The
set-up creates no particular incongruity that the audience
is aware of, but the punchline, at least initially, does not
make immediate sense. However, a way is found to allow
the punchline to be congruous (the resolution). Where the
two variants differ is as follows:
Surprise disambiguation: The set-up has two different
interpretations, but one is much more obvious to the
audience, who does not become aware of the other
meaning. The meaning of the punchline conflicts
with this obvious interpretation, but is compatible
with, and even evokes, the other, hitherto hidden,
meaning.
Two-stage (Suls): The punchline creates incongruity, and
then a cognitive rule must be found which enables
the content of the punchline to follow naturally from
the information established in the set-up.
There is no clear definition of the IR theory within
the literature, but these two versions capture the essence
of the idea, and most authors do not distinguish between
the two, nor between them and the more general notion of
IR (e.g. (Attardo, 1997, p.397)). The surprise disambig-
uation version is perhaps more prominent as an embod-
iment of the IR approach, and is often taken to be what
is meant by an IR theory (it is also essentially Raskin’s
SSTH; see Section 4.1).
As has been implied above and observed by various
writers, the general idea of IR may not be universally ap-
plicable to verbal humour, and each one of these two mod-
els fails to cover all the examples that might, informally,
be argued to be IR phenomena. However, it is clear that
there are at least some subclasses of jokes which are very
naturally accounted for, at least intuitively, by these mod-
els, so it is worthwhile examining them in more detail.
4 The surprise disambiguation model
4.1 The various interrelations
There are various entities centrally involved in the SD ac-
count:
: the first (more obvious) interpretation of the set-up
: the second (hidden) interpretation of the set-up
: the meaning of the punchline.
There are also various relationships and properties that
are of interest, based on various observations made in-
formally in the literature (the labels used here are invented
as ad hoc mnemonics – part of the problem is that there is
no standard terminology for these):
OBVIOUSNESS: is more likely than to be noticed
by the reader.
CONFLICT: does not make sense with
COMPATIBILITY: does make sense with
COMPARISON: there is some contrastive relationship, even
a clash, between and .
INAPPROPRIATENESS: is inherently odd, eccentric
or preposterous, or is taboo, in that it deals with
matters not conventionally talked of openly, such as
sexual or lavatorial matters, or forbidden political
sentiments. These differ in terms of which norms
are being flouted: those of everyday logic – lead-
ing to ABSURDITY – or those of socially acceptable
discourse – leading to TABOO effects.
Although some or all of these relations or properties are
sometimes proposed as the essential ingredients in IR hu-
mour, it is possible to find texts which, although plausibly
of the general form of an SD joke, display only some of
these relationships, yet which are humorous.
(6) Why do birds fly south in winter?
It’s too far to walk.
For example, (6) relies on a (hidden) ambiguity regarding
the focus of the initial question, and this is disambiguated
in a surprising way by the answer; that is, it falls within
the SD model. Although it could be argued that the hid-
den meaning is ABSURD, there is no evidence that it addi-
tionally has some significant COMPARISON with the more
obvious meaning. Similar remarks apply to (7).
(7) Postmaster: Here’s your five-cent stamp.
Shopper (with arms full of bundles): Do I have to
stick it on myself?
Postmaster: Nope. On the envelope.
Hence not all of these relations or properties are necessary
to create humour, even within the SD class of jokes.
It could be argued that there is no reason why theor-
ists should arrange their analyses to conform to the par-
ticular divisions chosen here. However, all discussions
of SD-style jokes admit, as pre-theoretic (or informally
theoretic) entities, the three items listed above (the mean-
ings of set-up and punchline). It is therefore reasonable
to ask how their theoretical commentaries can be stated
as properties of, or as relationships between, these ba-
sic entities. The lack of standard terminology means that
it is sometimes hard to be sure what types of entity a
proposed relation is between, and whether one author’s
“incongruity” is comparable to another’s. The six rela-
tions/properties used here (CONFLICT, etc.) are merely
chosen as some commonly occurring notions, to organise
this discussion. Whatever variants of these are adopted in
a theory of humour, we need fuller definitions in order to
proceed, whether we are interested in scientific falsifica-
tion or in computer simulations.
The above distinctions are not always made clearly.
Most confusingly, several of them (particularly CONFLICT,
COMPARISON, and INAPPROPRIATENESS) are referred
to as ‘incongruity’, thereby obscuring the relationships.
Shultz says ‘the incongruity consists in the relation between
the last line, or punchline, and the part that precedes the
last line’(Shultz, 1976, p.13) (i.e. CONFLICT). Of ex-
ample (3), Rothbart and Pien (1977) observe that the res-
olution involves an elephant sitting in a cup of hot chocol-
ate, and refer to this as ‘an incongruous situation’ (i.e.
ABSURDITY), and they suggest that this residual “incon-
gruity” is a potential problem for IR theory, in that the
oddity has not been eliminated (“resolved”).
The Semantic Script-based Theory of Humour (SSTH)
(Raskin, 1985) concentrates on COMPARISON as the cent-
ral factor, labelling it script opposition, but does not offer
much detail of how this opposition functions. (The im-
portance of script opposition seems to be the main reason
that Raskin regards the SSTH as having some substance
beyond the already familiar ideas which are here dubbed
‘surprise disambiguation’.) The SSTH also seems to pack-
age INAPPROPRIATENESS into script opposition, by re-
garding this (or other properties of the second interpret-
ation) as relative to the first interpretation, rather than as
inherent properties of the less obvious meaning. Giora
(1991) proposes that the main mechanism in SD-style jokes
is that the punchline provides a marked increase in in-
formativeness, and that the interpretations differ in their
‘markedness’. The notion of markedness is not form-
ally defined, but this seems to be tackling CONFLICT,
OBVIOUSNESS, and possibly COMPARISON. De Palma
and Weiner (1992) discuss a notion of accessibility for
the meanings of words, thus addressing OBVIOUSNESS.
Attardo (1997) suggests that SSTH’s ‘script opposition’
could be defined in terms of Giora’s and De Palma and
Weiner’s concepts, thus replacing a description of COM-
PARISON with an amalgam of accounts of CONFLICT and
OBVIOUSNESS.
4.2 Prediction
A further factor which is often discussed in the context of
SD-style jokes (and elsewhere) is “surprise”, or violated
expectations, but the term “expectation” also lacks a pre-
cise definition. In some cases, it may just mean the “ex-
pectation” that the more OBVIOUS interpretation is the
correct one. For example, (Suls, 1972, p.90) gives the ex-
ample (8), with the observation ‘the ending of the joke is
unexpected and incongruous... but can be so interpreted
as to make sense.’
(8) O’Riley was on trial for armed robbery. The jury
came out and announced, “Not guilty.”
“Wonderful,” said O’Riley, “does that mean I can
keep the money?”
Rather than simply allowing for a CONFLICT relation between
punchline and set-up, Suls feels the need to establish a
CONFLICT with some PREDICTION: ‘It is then predicted
that he will say “Does that mean I can go now?”’. How-
ever, the argument that there is CONFLICT with some spe-
cific PREDICTION, and that this causes the humorous ef-
fect, is unsupported. There is no evidence that this re-
mark rather than any other (e.g. “Thank you”) is pre-
dicted, nor that the humour of the actual punchline de-
pends on a deviation from some precise expectation. Suls
may feel the need to follow this line of reasoning owing to
his definition: ‘Incongruity of the joke’s ending refers to
how much the punch line violates the recipient’s expecta-
tions.’(p.92).
Shultz uses a similar definition to Suls, implying that
this captures the intentions of Schopenhauer (1819), Kant
(1892), Maier (1932) and Koestler (1970): ‘Incongruity
is usually defined as a conflict between what is expected
and what actually occurs in the joke’(Shultz, 1976, p.12).
(Notice that this is not identical to the gloss of “incongru-
ity” given by Shultz elsewhere in that article – see quo-
tation in section 4.1 above.) In this definition, the CON-
FLICT is with something fairly specific which is a PRE-
DICTION from the set-up, but which did not occur. That
is, there is an implied text whose form and interpretation
is different from that of the actual text; for example, (9),
or the much-quoted (10).
(9) Isn’t modern technology wonderful? I remember
the excitement when we were the first family in our
street to have cordless pyjamas. (Arnold Brown,
early 1990s)
(10) One more drink and I’ll be under the host. (Dorothy
Parker)
To give (9) an SD analysis, we can segment it into a
set-up of Isn’t modern technology .... to have cordless and
a punchline of pyjamas. The CONFLICT is between the
punchline and the PREDICTED interpretation (in which
the text ends with (tele)phones).
It may therefore be necessary to consider two possible
subtypes of the CONFLICT relation: one sets the punch-
line against the (more OBVIOUS meaning of the) set-up,
and the other sets the punchline against a predicted inter-
pretation (derived from the set-up).
PREDICTION can happen at various linguistic levels
– semantic, syntactic, lexical, etc. Such issues are famil-
iar within computational linguistics and psycholinguist-
ics, perhaps most relevantly in the study of “garden path”
sentences. It could be argued that in (9), a prediction
occurs at a semantic level, manifested lexically; alternat-
ively, there might be an explanation in terms of statistics
or semantic priming.
4.3 What is an interpretation?
Underlying all of the concepts listed here is the more gen-
eral question of what counts as an INTERPRETATION – is
it just the overall meaning of the text, or is the way of ex-
pressing it relevant? That is, could a text which unexpec-
tedly switched between two different ways of expressing
the same overall meaning act as a joke? Example (11) is
like (9) and (10), in that the punchline is the final word,
and that the CONFLICT is with a predicted ending rather
than with an already completed meaning.1
(11) Kevin Keegan isn’t fit to lace George Best’s drinks.
A further point of interest, however, is that the overall im-
port of both phrasings is the same (Keegan is a vastly in-
ferior player to Best); what differs is the idiomatic phras-
ing. A similar observation could be made about (12).
(12) One prostitute said to another, “Can you lend me
ten dollars until I get back on my back?” (Suls,
1972)
So if jokes such as (11) and (12) are to be analysed within
the SD framework, the notion of INTERPRETATION may
have to be generalised, to encompass variations in lin-
guistic expression, or at least to allow for a level prior
to decoding of idioms.
Example (13) could be analysed in SD terms if we al-
low an INTERPRETATION to include the pragmatic status
of an utterance.
(13) What’s the difference between an elephant and a
watermelon?
(I don’t know.)
You’d be a fine one to send to the store for a water-
melon. (Dienhart, 1999)
4.4 A sketch of the processing
In attempting to make the above discussion more precise,
it is instructive to consider the facilities that a processing
model would have to provide in order to interpret jokes in
the manner suggested by IR theories in general, and the
SD model in particular.
4.4.1 Analysing the set-up.
The processor must be capable of extracting a symbolic
representation of the meaning of a multi-sentence text,
and making at least some inferences from it. That is, it
must be a fairly general text-understanding module. Where
the text has more than one interpretation, it must be able
to select the most OBVIOUS one (either by having this in-
herent in its workings, or by having it separately compute
all readings and then select one).
1This joke is heavily dependent on cultural knowledge, namely:
George Best was a brilliantly gifted football player whose success led
to severe alcohol problems; Kevin Keegan was a very successful and
prominent, but less skilful, footballer; there is within football an idio-
matic phrase of condemnation ‘X is not fit to lace Y’s boots’. The line
is due to a UK sports journalist in the 1970s.
4.4.2 Predicting.
The system must be able to reason ahead so as to predict
at least the meaning of likely continuations of the text, and
even sometimes predict the actual lexical items which are
most probable.
4.4.3 Detecting the punchline.
Whether the punchline is one word, one sentence, or a se-
quence of sentences, the processor must not only be able
to interpret it (an ability already required for the set-up), it
must be able to construct a separate structure to compare
with the meaning of the set-up. The text will contain no
explicit markers to separate the punchline from the pre-
ceding text (except in special cases such as riddles), so
this is not trivial. The distinction raised above between
CONFLICT with the OBVIOUS interpretation of the set-up,
and CONFLICT with a PREDICTED ending becomes rel-
evant here. For the first of these, the punchline can be re-
cognised, almost by definition, by the fact that it does not
make sense (is not COMPATIBLE) with the current (most
OBVIOUS) interpretation of the text so far. That is, there
must be some form of assimilation mechanism which at-
tempts to form a coherent interpretation of all the material
in the text; when this mechanism finds a difficulty, then
this may indicate that a punchline has occurred. On the
other hand, where the CONFLICT is with predicted ma-
terial, some form of matching is needed. This will ne-
cessitate the system having a firm hypothesis about which
levels (semantic, syntactic, lexical) within the prediction
are crucial, as there may be cases, for example, where the
same semantic prediction can be expressed equally well
in different syntactic and lexical forms. In examples such
as (9), (10), (11) and (12), the prediction is for a partic-
ular lexical item, and the matching should be easier than
those cases where an unexpected concept is conveyed by
a whole sentence.
4.4.4 Processing the punchline.
Even if the punchline can be detected, it is not trivial to
make sense of it. In the detection stage, above, there were
two cases to consider depending on the type of CONFLICT
involved, but here they both reduce to much the same re-
quirements.
Where there has been no particular prediction, but the
punchline has failed to be assimilated into the ongoing in-
terpretation the task is to find an interpretation which does
cover both set-up and punchline. If all possible interpret-
ations have been computed as the text has been scanned,
the goal is to find one into which the meaning of the
punchline can be assimilated. If only one interpretation
has been maintained, some form of backtracking is neces-
sary, in which the processor must ignore the original in-
terpretation (which initially was the most OBVIOUS one),
and find an alternative which is COMPATIBLE with the
punchline.
Where the CONFLICT is with a predicted interpreta-
tion (or text), the situation is similar. The fact that the
punchline CONFLICTS with the predicted material sug-
gests that the interpretation must be reconsidered (although
see the remarks above about (11) and (12)). Again, the
goal is to find an alternative interpretation which covers
both set-up and punchline.
4.4.5 The humorous effect.
In the outline so far, the CONFLICT between punchline
and set-up has been used only to detect the punchline.
Some authors (see quotations earlier from Suls and from
Shultz) appear to propose that this is also the factor de-
termining the incongruity, and hence the humour. Other
accounts emphasise the role of what is labelled here COM-
PARISON (e.g. Raskin (1985)) or INAPPROPRIATENESS
(e.g. Freud (1966)). Some of these apparent differences
of opinion may be more an artefact of the lack of precise
terminology or definitions, in that the CONFLICT between
punchline and set-up may be conflated with, or confused
with, COMPARISON between the revised interpretation and
the initial interpretation. Whichever of these proposals is
adopted, it means that the processor must make some as-
sessment of the extent to which these factors (COMPAR-
ISON, INAPPROPRIATENESS, and perhaps CONFLICT) are
present. This will not be trivial.
4.5 Building on the SD model
What does this dissection of the surprise disambiguation
variant of incongruity-resolution theory tell us? Consider-
ation of the above steps, particularly the final stage (sub-
section 4.4.5) shows that virtually all of the defining prop-
erties of the SD model relate to the delivery of the humor-
ous content rather than the actual detection, comprehen-
sion or appreciation of humour. All the steps in the pro-
cessing, except for the last, would equally well describe a
simple misunderstanding, and not all misunderstandings
are humorous. In other words, the SD account does not
particularly illuminate one of the central concerns of IR
theory (and of much theorising about humour): what kind
of incongruity is funny? What the model does do is strip
away some of the more peripheral aspects about how this
particular genre of joke conveys the incongruity. In this
way, it reduces the research problem to a set of compon-
ent sub-problems. Most of the processing stages outlined
above depend upon knowledge about language and (via
linguistic meaning) the world, and research into language
processing will illuminate these parts of the model. The
subproblems are:
OBVIOUSNESS: What makes one potential interpretation
more obvious than another?
CONFLICT/COMPATIBILITY: How difficult to assimilate
must a piece of text be in order to stimulate a search
for another interpretation? How can this search be
guided by the portion of text that caused the re-
assessment?
COMPARISON: What does it mean for two interpretations
to differ in an amusing way (as opposed to merely
not being the same)?
INAPPROPRIATENESS: What factors make an interpreta-
tion inherently more amusing?
Overall: What combinations of these factors combine to
produce humour?
Of these, those concerning OBVIOUSNESS and CONFLICT
(or COMPATIBILITY) are to some extent more general re-
search issues in language processing, and the simplest as-
sumption is to posit as few special mechanisms as pos-
sible beyond those needed for normal language compre-
hension. However, jokes may (in common with stories)
require a certain semantic or pragmatic licence, so that
the audience can “suspend disbelief”: jokes can feature
entities which would qualify as semantically ill-formed in
some descriptions of the world, such as talking kangaroos
or walking cauliflowers. This freedom could complicate
the detection of punchline-induced CONFLICT.
Definitions of several of the necessary concepts might
be forthcoming from other disciplines, such as psycho-
linguistic research into ambiguity and ambiguity resol-
ution (OBVIOUSNESS); research into the interpretation
and assimilation of sentences within a discourse (CON-
FLICT, COMPATIBILITY); semantic research, studies of
belief systems and of social attitudes (COMPARISON, IN-
APPROPRIATENESS); sociology, psychology (INAPPRO-
PRIATENESS); psycholinguistic and computational research
into parsing and semantic interpretation during sentence
processing (PREDICTION); semantics (INTERPRETATION).
If these subsidiary concepts could be defined independ-
ently of humour theory (the theory-external approach) then
the SD model of humour would reduce to the last ques-
tion listed above (‘Overall’). On the other hand, if it is
necessary to have specific definitions of these concepts
(for example, if only certain types of COMPARISON res-
ult in humour), then the humour-theory content of the SD
would also include these theory-internal definitions.
The extent to which the hidden interpretation is IN-
APPROPRIATE (or has other suitable properties) may vary,
as may the strength of COMPARISON between the inter-
pretations. It is also conceivable that the sharpness of the
CONFLICT between punchline and the first interpretation
may vary, as may the OBVIOUSNESS of that interpret-
ation. Hence whatever formalisation is developed may
have to be capable of expressing degrees of some proper-
ties. A more detailed version of the SD model may in-
volve a complex disjunction of conditions, where each
condition is itself a specification of thresholds for cer-
tain properties. For example, maybe a text is humorous
if either the COMPARISON yields a value above a certain
threshold or the INAPPROPRIATENESS of the hidden in-
terpretation reaches some other minimum level.
The last three questions in the list above are central to
humour theory, and the solution of these would be a major
step forward.
This is not to say that the processing arrangement of
the SD model does not contribute to our understanding
of humour. Many authors have agreed that the humor-
ous effect usually depends upon the incongruity being
brought to the attention of the audience abruptly, and the
SD mechanism is one way to do this. Hence, it offers one
solution to that particular sub-problem within a theory of
humour.
5 Suls’ two-stage model
5.1 Overview of processing
As noted briefly in Section 3 above, Suls (1972) outlines
an IR-style processing model, which could be summar-
ised follows (see also Figure 1):
as text is read, make predictions
while no conflict with predictions, keep going
if input conflicts with predictions:
– if not ending - PUZZLEMENT
– if it is the ending, try to resolve:
no rule found - PUZZLEMENT
cognitive rule found - HUMOUR
This differs from the SD model in that Suls does not
demand that any ambiguity be present in the set-up, which
allows him to cover examples such as (5), (8) and (14),
where it is hard to argue for any ambiguity in the set-up.
(14) Fat Ethel sat down at the lunch counter and ordered
a whole fruit cake. “Shall I cut it into four or eight
pieces?” asked the waitress. “Four,” said Ethel,
“I’m on a diet.”
On the other hand, in examples where there is clear use of
ambiguity, such as (7), (6), (15) or (16), Suls would have
to postulate a cognitive rule which simulates the effect of
re-interpreting the set-up.2
(15) Mr Fields, do you believe in clubs for young people?
Only when kindness fails.
(Shultz, 1976) and elsewhere
(16) Can you tell me how long cows should be milked?
They should be milked the same as short ones.
(Shultz, 1976)
2There is a puzzling passage on p.96, where Suls, discussing work
by Kagan (1967) with infants, seems to imply that his model differs
from Kagan’s in that Suls’ system does indeed reinterpret the set-up,




































































































































































































































Figure 1: The Suls Two-Stage Model
Suls gives only a broad outline of his model, not much
more detailed than the summary given above of the SD
model, and his use of the term ‘incongruity’ is not very
precise, although it seems to correspond, in the informal
terminology of Section 4, to CONFLICT:
‘the perceiver finds his expectations about the
text disconfirmed by the ending of the joke....In
other words, the recipient encounters an in-
congruity — the punch line.’(p.82)
‘humor derives from experiencing a sudden
incongruity which is then made congruous’.(p.82)
‘Incongruity of the joke’s ending refers to how
much the punch line violates the recipient’s
expectations.’ (p.92)
5.2 Building on the “Two-Stage” model
Suls quotes approvingly from authors who observe that
perception (including language understanding) is an act-
ive process, so presumably he would accept that even in
a smooth-flowing congruous text, the perceiver may be
using cognitive rules to assimilate each sentence in turn.
A cognitive rule is, after all, a very general construct: ‘a
logical proposition, a definition, or a fact of experience’
(p.82). However, Suls gives no indication of what would
push a potential punchline over the threshold between nor-
mal rule-based comprehension into incongruity-driven reas-
oning. Moreover, he gives no discussion of the distinction
between a punchline simply not making sense (a misun-
derstanding) and being humorously incongruous. Since
he is not postulating an ambiguous set-up, the notions
called (in Section 4 above) COMPARISON and INAPPRO-
PRIATENESS do not enter into the debate.
Suls also does not explore the possibility that the nature
of the resolution (i.e. the content of the cognitive rule)
may contribute to the humour, although he suggests that
the complexity of the reasoning needed may be a factor.
His claim is that it is both necessary and sufficient for
humour if there is an incongruous punchline which can
make sense using a suitable cognitive rule.
Like the SD model outlined earlier, this model leaves
the hardest parts still to be done, and is more of a sketch
of a “delivery” mechanism than an explanation of incon-
gruity in humour.
The residual questions from Suls’ framework are:
(a) How surprising must a portion of text be to count as
a punchline? (Cf. discussion in Section 4.5 above)
(b) What is a ‘cognitive rule’?
(c) What types of cognitive rule give rise to a humor-
ous resolution rather than merely the patching up of
a misunderstanding?
The last of these questions could be seen as being the
central issue of much of humour research. It is quite com-
mon for writers on humour to observe that jokes often
rely on a ‘local logic’ or ‘para-logic’ (Attardo, 1994, Sec-
tion 4.0.2) – some distorted form of reasoning which is
close to, or analogous with, sound reasoning, but which is
sufficiently bizarre to produce humour. Inspecting Suls’
examples (particularly (8) and (14) above), it is plaus-
ible that the humorous effect relies heavily on some faulty
form of reasoning. This accords with the proposal by At-
tardo (1997) that the ‘logical mechanism’ of the ‘General
Theory of Verbal Humour’ (Attardo and Raskin, 1991)
can be regarded as the resolution within an IR-style model.
6 Comparing the two models
A superficial reading of articles on the two variants dis-
cussed above gives the impression that they are extremely
similar, but closer inspection shows interesting differences.
(a) The two models cover, or attempt to cover, different
subclasses of joke. The SD model requires an am-
biguous set-up, whereas the two-stage model makes
no mention of ambiguity.
(b) The SD model decomposes the humorous effect into
slightly simpler concepts (particularly COMPARISON,
ABSURDITY, and TABOO), and so at least starts to
address the issue of “incongruity”.
(c) The two-stage model relies on some (undefined)
form of “humorous logic”, and so leaves the diffi-
cult problem of “incongruity” relatively untouched.
As noted earlier, there are further jokes which have
been postulated to be incongruity-resolution jokes (e.g.
(2), (3)), but which are not covered by either of these ap-
proaches. (Although (2) involves ambiguity, the ambigu-
ity is not in the set-up). That is, what we have here are two
subclasses of IR humour, leaving others to be explored.
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